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This article studies the role played by the constitutionally empowered 
Panchayati Raj Institutions over a large irrigation system in West Bengal. The 
article tries to capture the linkages and the dynamics governing interaction 
between the Gram Panchayats and the Water User Associations. The infer-
ences are drawn from observed phenomenon pertaining to the role and 
relationship between the two sets of institutions over the Command Area 
Development Authority Programme (CADAP). While the advent of the canal 
water has created an agrarian dynamism over the canal command particularly 
among the marginal and landless farmers through boro-paddy cultivation, the 
process of institutionalizing farmers’ participation left much to be desired. 
While the representatives of the Water User Associations often faltered to 
draw collective action from the farmers, the political actors proved to be much 
stronger. However even these actors were not proactive and responded only 
to crisis situations. Thus the system continues to operate at the sub-optimal 
level and seems to have achieved a low level of equilibrium. 
INTRODUCTION
Reform in the irrigation sector in the form of decentralized irrigation management 
over large canal systems has been the buzzword in the policy arena for years now, 
but so far agrarian West Bengal has hardly been studied in this regard. In spite 
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of the presence of large canal irrigation systems in the state and a rich history of 
canal irrigation as depicted in the writing of Willcocks (1930), there is a strange 
paucity of recent literature on canal irrigation in West Bengal. This article, 
while it tries to portray the process of decentralized reform of canal irrigation in 
the state, also aims to address the issue of linkages between the formal Panchayati 
Raj Institutions (PRIs) and the Water User Associations (WUAs).
The current mode of decentralization is in the form of devolution of critical 
recurring activities that include maintenance of irrigation infrastructures, man-
agement of water distribution over the command and also the task of collection 
of irrigation charge from the farmers, which limits the domain of the WUAs. The 
domain of the WUAs is limited at the tertiary level,1 with limited control over the 
resource at the secondary level, while the headwork of the system still remains 
in the control of the government bureaucracy. This limits the authorized and 
intended domain of action of the organizations. Such an arrangement may have 
the effect of reducing the member-centricity (Shah 1996) of these institutions. 
On the other hand, it needs to be mentioned upfront that irrigation, though a 
very critical input for prosperous agriculture, is not the sole input. So while the 
water user associations may try to build allegiance, they may fail to do so because 
of the presence of bottlenecks in any part of the supply chain of necessities for 
the agriculture production system. In a scenario characterized by high priced 
fertilizers and pesticides, seeds with low yields, poor storage and marketing of 
the agriculture produce, the patronage centrality (Shah 1996) of these institutions 
to the farmers also reduces. Though the devolution principle promises much in 
spirit, the modality of such devolution can constrain performance on intended 
promises. It becomes important to see if there are some complimentary insti-
tutional arrangements which can be coupled with the present form of devolution. 
One such arrangement is to see whether these WUAs can be dovetailed with 
the PRIs and thus enhance their domain as being part of the overall agriculture 
development process.
 This article draws inferences from field observations pertaining to the im-
plementation of a decentralization programme in the state of West Bengal. 
The decentralization programme involved the formation of a Beneficiary 
Committee (BC)2 over Teesta Barrage Project as a part of the Command Area 
Development Authority Programme (CADAP). The methodology followed was 
an embedded case study over two blocks in Jalpaiguri District of West Bengal, 
which comes under the Teesta–Mahananda Canal System of the Teesta Barrage 
Project (TBP). During the course of our fieldwork we were engaged in detailed 
Group Discussions with the farmers and unstructured interviews with Panchayat 
members, farmers, BC members and petty contractors. Most of the time these 
were conducted in the panchayat office, at local tea shops and over farmlands. 
Also, transect analysis was done to check the condition of the field channels. 
 Panchayat Irrigation Management 3
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF RURAL MANAGEMENT, 5(1), 2009: 1–20
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA
The study area was chosen primarily for two reasons. The district of Jalpaiguri 
falls in the North Bengal region which compare unfavourably with the South 
Bengal districts in terms of general developmental parameters and also in terms 
of political clout of the ruling left party. Also, the bulk of studies on PRIs in West 
Bengal have focused on different South Bengal districts, which also motivated 
us to study some districts in North Bengal.3 The district of Jalpaiguri lies partly 
over the command of the Teesta Barrage Project which, once completed, will be 
the largest irrigation project in the entire Eastern region. This district also has a 
large chunk of tribal population. Jalpaiguri is agriculturally backward with the 
lowest food grain productivity among all the districts in the state, being rated 
ninth among 18 districts in cropping intensity and twelfth in irrigation coverage. 
Compositely, in terms of agriculture development, Jalpaiguri was found to be 
in fourteenth position in the state (Chatterjee and Ghosh 2003). The Net Sown 
Area in the district is around 3.42 lakh hectares, while the irrigation coverage 
is only 26 per cent and the irrigation coverage through canals is around 17 per 
cent, both the values distinctly lower than the state averages. The predominance 
of canal irrigation among all sources of water is clearly reflected in the district, 
as out of a total irrigated area of 89.4 thousand hectares, around 58.9 thousand 
hectares (66 per cent) is irrigated through canals; these are mainly through the 
Teesta Barrage Project and the Kartowa Barrage project, which also draws its 
water from the Teesta (GoWB 2004a).
In spite of the lack of agrarian dynamism in this district, it has shown the highest 
increase in cropping intensity during the period of 1995–96 to 2000–2001—a 
whopping increase of 62.14 per cent as compared to the state average increase of 
2.44 per cent (indiastat.com). The district also shows the greatest decline in the 
size of landholdings, at 14 per cent in the same period, as compared to the state 
average of 3.53 per cent (GoWB 2005). Thus a phenomenon is noticed whereby 
the size of the landholding is reducing and the intensity of using the parcels of 
land is increasing in this district. Both these features can be attributed to the 
Teesta Barrage Project (TBP), which we will explain subsequently. 
The TBP is the latest major irrigation project in West Bengal and is supposedly 
the largest irrigation project in the whole of eastern India. When completed, it 
will have a designed command area of more than 9 lakh hectares, irrigating five 
districts in North Bengal (namely Jalpaiguri, North Dinajpur, South Dinajpur, 
Coochbehar and Malda). The project started in 1975 and currently only part of 
Sub-stage 1 of Stage 1 under Phase 1 is ongoing. The target under Phase 1 is 
to create irrigation potential of 5.46 lakh hectares. About 2.23 lakh hectares will 
be covered in Phase 2 and 1.53 lakh hectares in Phase 3. Further, it was decided 
that in Stage 1, under Phase 1 there needs to be created an irrigation potential 
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of around 3.42 lakh hectares. At current prices, the cost of the project is Rupees 
20,680 million. The Teesta Barrage project consists of a series of five barrages, 
namely Jaldhaka, Teesta, Mahananda, Dauk, Nagor and Tangon, connected 
by link canals. The project thus takes an L shaped structure. Currently Teesta, 
Mahananda and Dauk barrages have been completed. The Teesta–Mahananda 
Link canal and Mahananda Main Canal along with its distribution structure are 
partially completed. Irrigation of certain patches has been taking place for the 
last eight–10 years (Ghosh 2005). 
The study focused on the Teesta–Mahananda Link Canal (TMLC) which 
passes through the Jalpaiguri district, over two blocks: Rajganj and Jalpaiguri Sadar. 
The major part of the distribution network of the TMLC has been completed. 
The TMLC is a case of Inter-Basin Transfer that links the mountain river Teesta, 
tributary of the Brahmaputra, to the Mahananda, a tributary of the Ganga. The 
project is one of its kind, where a mountainous river has been tamed and large areas 
in the plains are being irrigated, using its water without creating any reservoirs. 
Of the 10 distributaries coming out from the TMLC, this study was carried out 
over distributary D2 and Minor M3 that comes out from D2. D2 and M3 are 
spread over the Rajganj and Jalpaiguri Sadar blocks of the district. From the head 
of D2 to the tail end of M3 there are 4 gram panchayats (GPs) namely Mantadari 
and Shikarpur under Rajganj block and Belakoba and Bahadur under Jalpaiguri 
Sadar block. Thus the study area was spatially divided into head, middle and tail 
ends, whereby Mantadari and Shikarpur came at the Head, Belakoba GP at the 
middle and Bahadur GP at the tail end. 
Formally, the gram panchayat even in a state like West Bengal enjoys limited 
devolution of power and rights over canal systems. While the canal rights rest 
with the irrigation department, the rights of the field channels that need to be 
built at the farm level do not rest with the department as they need to be built 
over private agricultural land. This is where the gram panchayat intervenes. The 
intervention lies in implementation of the scheme of construction of lined field 
channels undertaken by the Command Area Development Authority (CADA). 
We will now try to understand the nuances of the CADAP and portray the role 
of different institutions in this programme.
The CADA, Teesta, was entrusted with the responsibility of construction of 
lined channels from the already completed distributaries and the minors and 
sub minors of the TBP in order to realize the created irrigation potential. In the 
absence of financial authority and the requisite manpower to undertake the project 
on its own and following a state Government Order, CADA, Teesta, decided 
that the formation of lined field channels would be implemented through the 
panchayat, and the gram panchayat was to undertake the role of the implementa-
tion agency. The procedure of implementation of this programme follows a series 
of actions concerning the farmers, the gram panchayat and the CADA. To start 
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with, a group of farmers who are willing to donate part of their land and get a 
lined field channel (FC) come together and submit a proposal for the construction 
of a field channel to their farms. The proposal is given to the concerned gram 
panchayat. The essence of this programme is decentralized management with the 
increased role of farmers at the tertiary level whereby the management of the FC 
and distribution of water is undertaken by this group. The group for this purpose 
forms a Beneficiary Committee (BC) and along with their proposal they provide 
an undertaking expressing their willingness to undertake the management of 
the FC in the post-construction stage. Since such responsibility requires funds, 
the group has to open a bank account in any bank. This account becomes a 
joint account of three people selected from the group. The pradhan of the gram 
panchayat, who is the nodal implementation officer, now collates all applications in 
the panchayat area and forwards them to the CADA. The CADA, after receipt of 
these applications, undertakes a technical review of the project proposals and with 
some correction approves the project and forwards it to the state capital for the 
sanctioning of funds. Once the projects are sanctioned, CADA forwards it to the 
pradhan who now implements them with the help of the Beneficiary Committees 
(BCs). During the process of implementation the CADA may provide technical 
assistance. The money is released to the pradhan in instalments. The CADA pays 
the pradhan at the market rate and also does not impose any income tax against 
him/her. This is how the project gets implemented. The cost of the project was 
initially shared between the state and the central government in the ratio of 50: 50, 
but post 2003 a component of the farmers’ contribution was added and now 
the break up stands as 10: 40: 50 between the farmers, the state and the central 
government. Till now most of the BCs have been formed over D2 and M3 over 
the four GPs of Mantadari, Shikarpur, Belakoba and Bahadur. The reason for 
this is that D2 and M3 are the two largest distribution infrastructures in terms 
of the water capacity, length of the canals and the command area. 
Since a large number of decision takes place in the socio-political domain in 
the villages of West Bengal, it was important to note the political composition of 
the gram panchayat at the outset, which also helps later on to interpret diverse 
findings (Figure 1). Mantadari GP where the programme of CADA started is a 
Left–dominated panchayat where the CPI (M) is in absolute majority. Next was 
Shikarpur, which was a hung GP, where there had recently been a roll-over in the 
GP whereby an independent candidate (who is also the pradhan), with the help 
of four breakaway Trinamool Congress representatives, had switched sides in 
favour of the Left. Through this process the Left could wrest control of this GP 
after a long time. Belakoba was again a hung GP where the Congress, Trinamool 
Congress and BJP have come together to form a grand coalition (mahajoth). The 
Bahadur GP located at the tail end is again a Left ruled GP where there is absolute 
majority of the CPI(M). Thus, there is a clear distinction in terms of political 
composition in all these four GPs. The differences in political composition seem 
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to impact the implementation of the programme as we explain subsequently. Thus 
there is a clear political demarcation over our study area whereby the head and 
the tail end GP are controlled by the left front, mainly the Communist Party of 
India (Marxists) [CPI(M)], but the other two GPs do not have a strong presence 
of the left front.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Under the CADA programme, 99 field channels have been constructed in the last 
six years. Though the programme started from Mantadari, most of the FCs are 
located over Belakoba, Shikarpur and Bahadur panchayats.4 During the course of 
this study 18 field channels were visited. They were found to irrigate around 1,187 
hectares with an average area of 85 hectares per channel. But the area irrigated by 
different field channels showed large variations. While 87 hectares were found 
to be the created irrigation potential, only around 42 hectares actually received 
irrigation from the canal. Since this value showed a high degree of variation, we 
decided to calculate the utilization ratio, that is, the ratio of the designed command 
and the actual command.5 For 11 FCs, out of the 18 that we studied, we could 
obtain the designed command and the current level of area that is irrigated. 
Figure 1
Political Composition of the Gram Panchayats in the study area
Source: GoWB 2004b.
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It was found that the irrigation potential utilized was only 52.4 per cent with a 
low standard deviation. This shows that the utilization rate of these field channels 
was uniformly low. 
In order to see if there was any pattern governing the low utilization rate it was 
decided to run a regression of the independent variables like length of the field 
channels, members in the BC, number of farmers in the command and command 
area over the utilization rate. It was presumed that long field channels catering to 
large number of farmers would show a lower utilization rate. Longer the channel, 
greater will be the conveyance loss and larger the farmer density in the command, 
greater will be managerial problems, both resulting in low utilization. The size 
of the BC was postulated to impact in both directions. While transaction cost 
may have a downward effect, the increased participation may act positively on the 
utilization rate. However, it was found that the designed command was negatively 
linked with the utilization rate. Thus, systems having a larger command showed 
a lower utilization rate. The number of members in the beneficiary committee 
had a positive correlation with the utilization rate. Both of them were significant 
at an 18 per cent level of significance.6 The model, though it was a good fit, failed 
to explain the entire range of variations. The overall explainability of the model 
was found to be low, thus indicating that apart from the often quoted reasons 
behind the low utilization rate there must be other factors that contributed to the 
low utilization rate. While the utilization rates of the FC were low, the increase 
in area under irrigation over the command was found to increase statistically 
significantly, from 677 to 2471 hectares (F = 119.412, p = .000). Also it was found 
that there was an anomaly between the data that was furnished by the CADA 
pertaining to the panchayats and our primary data based on the estimates and 
guesstimates of the beneficiaries (see Table 1). 
Thus, to capture the fine interlocking that contributed to lower utilization over 
the command and its subsequent interpretations, it becomes important to depend 
more on the qualitative information as furnished by our respondents. It was also 
important to raise questions like: Was this programme making a significant impact 
on the farmers? Who was benefiting? Who was losing out? Why? How has the 
involvement of panchayat affected the implementation of the programme? 
During the course of this study we had met and had discussions with many 
farmers. We administered a checklist pertaining to the outcome and impact of this 
programme across 48 farmers. Among them, there were 24 marginal farmers, 12 
small farmers, seven semi-medium farmers and two medium farmers. There were 
no large farmers among our sample.7 Most of them were primarily dependent 
on agriculture, though only 17 respondents reported agriculture as their sole 
livelihood activity. Around 65 per cent of respondents in our sample were found 
to practice agriculture as an allied activity, as they thought that sole dependence 
on agriculture could be a risky proposition. Such a composition reflects the 
practice of low–value agriculture in the area. Many of the respondents practised 
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allied professions like general labour work, tea garden labourer, agriculture 
labourer, fishing business, local shopkeeper, contractor and van driver to name 
a few. Though the exclusive dependence on agriculture as an occupation was 
low, agriculture seems to have intensified. The cropping intensity was found to 
increase significantly from 138 per cent to 180 per cent (F = 11.83, p = .001). 
While an increase in the intensification of agriculture is noticed over the canal 
command it was found that there has also been increase in the cultivated area 
over the area owned by the farmers, which indicates the possibility of leasing in of 
land. We analyzed the lease–in phenomenon and tried to interpret the economics 
behind it (see Figure 2).
It was found that there was clear distinction across landholding size between 
those who leased out land and those who leased in land. Around 30 per cent 
of the marginal farmers were found to lease-in land over the command and 
more strangely, 11 per cent who leased–in land under this category were earlier 
landless. The phenomenon that is noticed over the command area of Teesta is 
not an exception. It was reported by Webstar that even in the early years of the 
Damodar Valley Canal command, the marginal and the landless were found to 
lease–in land from the medium or large farmers. This he had termed as the ‘pro-
poor’ nature of canal irrigation (Webstar 1992).
Table 1
Field Channels Constructed under CADA Programme
FC No.
Actual Irri. Area 
(in Hectares)∗
FC Length 
(in Meters)∗
FC Length 
(in Meters)#
Actual Irri. Area 
(in Hectares)#
35L 50 2500 3400 92
154 R Na 1900 1770 41
98 L 24 1800 1860 44
108 R 24 1600 1630 41
82 L Na 350 309 6.5
169 L 42 1400 1675 40
158 L 102 1600 1450 38
149L/R 98 1200 1625 40
128 L 42 2000 1550 40
111 R 6 1200 1000 26
129 R Na 1630 1700 40.5
136 R 183 1600 1730 40
2 L 7 110 192 3
3 L 8 120 316 5
8 L 7 Na 391 5.5
31 L 7 Na 2600 57
Notes: ∗FGD with farmers/BC members/contractors.
 ## = based on the CADA information.
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There has been shift in the cropping pattern among the farmers over the Teesta 
canal command. Prior to availability of canal water, jute was one of the major 
crops in the area. However, the economics of jute at that time was unfavourable 
for profitable agriculture. On one hand, it was labour intensive and so the entire 
landholding was seldom cultivated. The farmers would grow jute only on small 
patches, mostly to cater to their domestic requirement, while the surplus was sold 
in the market. On the other hand, the price obtained for jute during those years 
(in the 1990s) was pretty low. Low prices were fuelled by both excess production 
(since most of the farmers would grow jute) and market manipulation by the 
local jute traders known as phore. Sometimes there would be a cartel among all 
the buyers and on other occasions sales restrictions imposed by the local farmers’ 
organization also dampened the price level. According to the farmers over the 
command, the crop economics of jute was around Rs 2,625 per hectare. 
With the advent of canal water jute has given way to boro-paddy over this 
area and the prominent crop cycle had shifted from aman-jute combination to 
aman-boro combination. Advent of boro–paddy over the area has also resulted 
in a differential land tenure system. One of the tenural arrangements is aadhiyaa 
system. In this, a farmer cultivates boro-paddy by leasing in land under a specific 
contractual arrangement, whereby the cost of cultivation is borne by the lessee 
and only the cost of manure is provided by the landowner. The final output will 
be shared equally between the lessee and the landowner. Another dominant form 
of tenural system is to lease-in land in exchange of fixed cash payments. The cost 
of cultivation and the yield under such a tenural system is then solely enjoyed by 
the lessee. Again this fact seems to follow what Webstar reported in his paper in 
the early years of the DVC canal command (Webstar 1992).
Figure 2
Leasing-In Phenomenon in the Command Area of Teesta Barrage Project
Source: Authors’ survey over the command area.
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Boro cultivation has changed the developmental scenario in the hitherto poor 
villages and has substantially contributed to the food security in the region. The 
crop economics as reported by the marginal farmers in our sample shows that 
boro-paddy yields around 86 mounds per hectare, yielding a surplus of around 
Rs 10,202 per hectare. Aman paddy continues to remain the prominent crop 
during the Kharif season. It yields around 50 mounds per hectare and Rs 6,892 
per hectare. The Kharif paddy is mostly rain-fed and is now more assured with 
the advent of the canal system. Even in case of rain failure, a critical supplemental 
irrigation can be provided from the canal system. 
Around 24 per cent of the marginal farmers continued to grow jute and due 
to higher market prices they began to earn roughly Rs 18,350 per hectare, which 
was even more than boro–paddy. This result has different ramifications. The 
tail-enders of the command, who do not get water in some plots of their land 
from the canal, continue to grow jute. Also the reduction in the mass production 
has forced the price upwards. However, boro has not been facing competition 
from jute cultivation since jute is labour intensive and farmers usually put only 
a fraction of their landholding under jute, and also, there is a huge boost in the 
food security status brought in through boro cultivation. Also, availability of fallow 
land which could be dug out for rotting of jute has now drastically reduced with 
the advent of boro cultivation. 
The leasing-in of land was, however, much lower in the case of small farmers 
while 33 per cent of the semi-medium category farmers were seen to lease-in 
land. Since the respondents under medium and large were largely absent we did 
not try to compute for them. Thus, leasing–in of land seems to take a ‘U’-shaped 
form with relatively high leasing-in among the marginal/landless and the semi 
medium farmers, but low among the small farmers. The specific reason behind 
such a phenomenon needs to be probed further.
Thus, the crop economics and the cropping pattern, including the tenural 
system, strongly indicate the upsurge of marginal and landless farmers with the 
advent of canal water. But the apparent positive picture over the command is 
also the source of the paradox. On one hand, while it was seem to act as a pro-
poor tool, on the other hand a large part of the command of the field channels 
continued to remain uncatered to. It was found that around 56 per cent of the 
respondents said that there is conveyance loss in the field channel due to which 
they receive water late or are devoid of water. 
In such a situation it becomes important to look at the reasons behind the 
low utilization based on qualitative information based on the experiences of the 
agrarian populace. Most of the respondents (34 per cent) who complained about 
not receiving adequate water from the FC attributed it to faulty construction; 
23 per cent of them attributed this to the coercive extraction by the farmers 
within the FC command and 23 per cent of them attributed this to the coercive 
extraction by the farmers outside the FC command. Most of the respondents from 
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Bahadur panchayat came under this third category as they faced water problem 
particularly during scarcity because of illegal bunding by the farmers at the head 
of the system, mainly from the Shikarpur and Belakoba panchayat. All the three 
responses have important implications. 
The construction of field channels was to be done by the pradhan through the 
beneficiary committees. But there remained a gap between the designed process 
of decentralization and the reality. On a number of occasions the beneficiary 
was born on a death bed and the contracts of construction of the field channels 
were hijacked by those who were well connected. In other places, the BC was 
institutionalized but just to get the proposal sanctioned from the panchayat and 
the department; the construction was undertaken by some petty contractor whose 
land may or may not be in the command. The role of the BC was restricted to 
ensuring collective action from the farmers during the construction phase only 
for the sacrifice of land for the canal construction. Also, there were cases reported 
by the respondents whereby the contractors, by virtue of their position in the 
political society, would actually collude with the technical surveyor and manipulate 
the channel construction. Thus, when we try to match the information collected 
from the beneficiaries with the official figures they do not tally. The mismatch 
also indicates the ignorance of the BC or the farmers in the command who were 
in accordance to the rule supposed to be the builders and managers of the field 
channels. This had its usual impact in the quality of the field channels. In a number 
of cases the field channels were breaking down, more so in the middle and tail 
ends. The reason is quite simple. The objective of the farmers over the command 
would have been maximization of profit from agriculture, for which they would 
have ensured top quality distribution infrastructure, as water is a crucial input 
for boro cultivation which yields cash or food security. The contractor does not 
have a direct stake like the farmer, and would just try to maximize his profit from 
the construction, in the process compromising on the materials to save cost and 
ending up building an inferior infrastructure. 
The prevalence of coercive extraction as reported by our respondents also 
questions the effectiveness of the BC. In very few cases we found that the BC 
was actually functional. Even a classic case of market failure was observed in 
one of the schemes where it was found that both the tail end and the head end 
farmers kept on waiting for each other to rehabilitate a part of the canal which 
was broken but no one actually did anything and ultimately they had to opt for 
a cheap alternate source.
As far as the water distribution within the command of the FC is concerned it 
was found that while only 20 per cent respondents who were at the head of the 
FC command complained about irregular supply, all the respondents who were 
located at the end of the FC complained about not getting water, or getting limited 
supply from the FC. The point to note is that even 47 per cent of the respondents 
whose land were found to lie somewhere in the middle also complained about 
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limited supply of water. Around 19 per cent of the respondents attributed the 
lack of adequate supply to a combination of faulty construction and coercive ex-
traction which resulted in the scarcity. Thus the conditions of the distribution 
infrastructure question the pattern of implementation of the CADA programme. 
The honest spirit that guided the institutional reform over the Teesta Canal Com-
mand decentralization using the panchayat institution seriously lacked teeth when 
it came down to actual implementation.
While a part of the FC command remains water-scarce, in the actual situation 
it hardly remains unirrigated. In many occasion it was found that the farmers 
constructed mud channels from the canal and conveyed water to their field. But 
these were never free from hassles and dispute. A case of externality lied at the 
core of such disputes. It was found that the farmers over whose land the mud 
channel had to be constructed would not allow the other farmer to use the channel 
to convey water on days when he applied manures and fertilizer; otherwise the 
investment of the landowning farmer would be washed off, while the farmer 
who received the water would benefit doubly, both because of receipt of water 
and receipt of fertilizer and manure washed along with it, which would reduce 
his cost of agriculture. On such occasions the panchayat representatives and party 
representatives often resolved those conflicts.
The process of construction of the FC and the process of institutionalization 
was not uniform everywhere. It was found that in Bahadur GP which lies at the 
tail end, most of the field channels were in better condition. Here, the role of the 
BCs were also palpable and it was not difficult to find people who had actually 
put their brains together in the construction of those field channels. Even the 
cases of coercive extraction among farmers within the command were limited, 
but the conflict lay above the command. Thus the case of Bahadur GP allows us 
to hypothesize a scenario where when there is absolute scarcity of the water at 
the outlet, then there is less conflict below the outlet. In case of Shikarpur and 
Belakoba GP, however, where the absolute volume of water was not a problem, 
the conflict was below the outlet.
The importance of canal water in agriculture is reflected in the incidences of 
violence reported in the countryside on account of water distribution. Around 
77 per cent of our respondents reported instances of conflicts pertaining to 
water distribution in the canal. The role of the BC vis-à-vis the local panchayat 
representatives becomes important in such a context, as the crisis situation 
reveals the relative power exercised by the two different actors: (i) the social 
actor represented by the BC representatives who, according to the rule, need 
to manage the water distribution, thereby exerting a peer pressure to maintain 
an optimal situation; and (ii) the political actor who formally does not have any 
role to play in the water distribution and cannot even have any right over the 
canal without prior permission of the irrigation department (GoWB). We found 
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that while 19 per cent of the respondents said that in a crisis situation the BC 
resolves the conflicts, around 56 per cent of the respondents report that it is the 
panchayat representatives and sometimes the pradhan who resolves the conflict. 
On many occasions it was found that conflicts were resolved by the local panchayat 
representative or the party representative not just pertaining to water distribution, 
but also water conveyance when the unlined channels needed to be drawn over 
somebody’s field. In the case of Bahadur GP, where the conflict spread out to a 
different panchayat, even the pradhan had to interfere along with the higher order 
panchayat functionaries and government officials. Thus broadly speaking, on one 
hand we find that while the irrigation scenario has caused a marked improvement 
among the landless and marginal farmers, the small farmers and semi-medium 
have also made some improvement. With the advent of the boro cultivation, the 
cropping intensity and the area of cultivation has increased. We wanted to check 
our findings with the farmers’ perception. It was found that around 87 per cent 
of our respondent felt that area under irrigation has increased with the advent of 
canal waters and 87.5 per cent respondents agreed that their agriculture income 
has increased (see Figure 3). However the increase of agriculture income is not 
universal. While there has definitely been a boost among the landless and marginal 
farmers, the large and medium farmers were not positive with the impact of the 
canal. The reason for this was the amount of crop diversification that they could 
employ earlier, including cultivation of rabi vegetables and potato, which has re-
duced with the advent of canal irrigation. For them, the aman-boro cycle may not 
seem very lucrative. In such a scenario we found two possibilities: those who did 
not get canal water would rather happily source alternative source of irrigation 
and continue to grow different crops, while the net losers seemed to be those 
who neither received canal waters nor could even grow other rabi crops including 
potato because of the increased soil moisture caused due to percolation of canal 
water. Thus it was not uncommon to find farmers outside the command growing 
potato intensively with the help of shallow tube wells or growing vegetables by 
lifting water from the farm pond.
The demand for labour requirement has also increased and the average 
wage rate that was reported over the area was about Rs 70 per day for males and 
Rs 50 per day for females. This was supported by our respondents where around 
89.6 per cent respondents were of the view that the demand for labour has 
increased (see Figure 3).
While the advent of Teesta water has brought a change in the agricultural 
scenario, the process of decentralization through involvement of farmer groups 
in the form of institutionalizing beneficiary committees lacked teeth. In most 
of the field channels we visited, the beneficiary committee lay moribund. The 
collective action in terms of maintenance of the field channels and ensuring 
proper distribution of irrigation water across the command was largely absent. 
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On the contrary, it was not uncommon to find collective action among farmers 
to create cross-bunding over the canal and lift water to a level that allows them 
to irrigate more area. In the tail end GP it was found that during the boro season, 
the farmers would contribute collectively for tea and snacks while they would 
work together to create cross-bunds over the canals, to stop the flow of water. 
Thus the anarchy pertaining to water distribution prevailed. These observations 
were largely supported even by our respondents. While 70 per cent perceived 
that field channels have been better constructed due to the CADA programme 
only 56.8 per cent residents felt that water distribution has improved with the 
construction of the lined channels, and an even group of 39 per cent perceived 
that there has been a reduction in the water conflict (see Figure 3).
The conflict pertaining to water distribution seems to remain unchanged even 
with the institutionalization of the beneficiary committees, largely because the 
power was not devolved to the beneficiary committee and in many occasions they 
just existed on paper. It was found that on a number of occasions the beneficiary 
committee failed to encourage collective action among the farmers and thus the 
farmers depended on the panchayat member at the village level and in some cases 
the only fall-back option available was the local party. Thus, even at the micro level 
the political actors and the panchayat representative or the party representative 
seemed to draw more command then the community social actors which would 
have been the case had the BC been much more active than what it currently is. 
Strangely, the intervention by the gram panchayat or panchayat samiti, though 
palpable as one talked with the farmers, was in no way proactive. Rather, it was 
a knee-jerk response to a problem. Any matter which moved beyond the private 
domain automatically would move into the panchayat domain.
 Thus the impact on the farmers with the advent of Teesta water cannot be solely 
attributed to the implementation of the field channel programme. The area under 
irrigation has increased with the advent of the field channels but mainly because 
little area was irrigated before the construction of field channels and impromptu 
actions such as construction of mud channels would on many occasions remain 
unrecorded. In spite of the construction of lined field channels the farmers always 
had a cheaper alternative though a more heckling one. They would bypass the 
lined channel by choice or by compulsion by constructing unlined mud channels 
and withdraw water from the canals through these temporary unlined field 
channels. Though this entails one of the major components of conflict raised 
due to a typical problem of externality, there were instances where the local party 
officials would act as intervening agents who would locally manage the situation 
as and when the need arose. Thus while on one hand there would be a small 
fraction of farmers who would benefit from the lined channels, one could find 
a larger group adopting the cheaper option. 
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INFERENCES AND CONCLUSION
Learning from the implementation programme of CADA programme suggests 
that the role of civil society (in this case the institutionalization of the beneficiary 
committee) is limited until and unless it is routed through the political society, 
which is powerful enough to propagate collective action among the populace. 
The power of the political society at the grass root level emanates from three 
sources (see Figure 4).
Figure 4
Power Structure of the West Bengal Panchayat Gram Panchayat
1. One comes directly from the governmental policy and ideology of 
bestowing of functions into the hands of the panchayat. This results in 
the entire rural developmental activity being channelized through the 
panchayat institution. This results in the panchayat becoming the mai-
baap of the general rural populace, becoming a government in itself. Thus 
the panchayat continues to wield the patronage baton as bestowed from 
the above by the government and continues to become more and more 
powerful; the power seems to increase as one moves down from the zilla 
parishad to the gram panchayat. Thus Ghatak and Ghatak (2002: 52) quoted 
in their paper ‘…the god in heaven and the pradhan in the countryside are 
equally powerful…’. Such power often becomes a double edged weapon. 
On one hand, with increasing power the gram panchayat starts becoming 
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a bureaucratic organization whereby they become less responsive to 
the populace and more responsive to the party. Thus there remains a 
potential that administrative bureaucracy is replaced with panchayat 
bureaucracy. On the other hand, the channelization of the entire range 
of rural developmental activity through the panchayat implies that the 
villagers within the panchayat jurisdiction have to depend on the panchayat 
for one or the other reason, and their daily life gets embedded into the 
panchayati system. Thus at least theoretically, the ‘member centrality’, 
‘domain centrality’ and ‘patronage centrality’ (Shah 1996) automatically 
increases and the gram panchayat or panchayat samiti becomes powerful 
enough to draw any level of collective action from the community. For 
instance, while the irrigation department wrests the legal right over the 
canal systems, they actually fail to appease the villagers to release water for 
the tail enders and remove the illegal blockades in crisis situation. In all 
such situations the panchayat representatives who do not have any legal 
power over the canal systems seem to enjoy a comparative advantage and 
have to accompany the departmental staff. This is the very same reason 
why the departmental staff also feels that involvement of panchayat in the 
CADA programmers ensured some success which would have definitely 
not been achieved in case the panchayat had been bypassed.
2. There is also a power that emanates from below. At the grass root level, 
different organizations like krishak sabha, local committee and gram 
panchayat overlap. This overlapping of the party and the panchayat also 
endows a lot of power to the panchayat. The panchayat at various levels has 
a check from the strong political presence of the party. Thus while the party 
may feed this organization, they also act as checks to the organization. Thus 
in the background of every zilla parishad there is a district committee (DC); 
for every panchayat samiti there is a zonal committee (ZC) organization 
and behind every gram panchayat there is a local committee (LC). Such 
an arrangement ensures that even if the panchayat representatives are 
not accountable to the public at large, they still seem to have a strong ac-
countability towards the party. Thus, in rural West Bengal there exists a 
vertical accountability of the elected panchayat representatives towards the 
political representatives, at least in those panchayat which are controlled by 
the CPI(M). The importance of vertical accountability was clearly notice-
able in the case of the construction and maintenance of field channels 
across the GPs. In both Shikarpur and Belakoba panchayat the FCs were 
falling off badly, either due to faulty construction or lack of maintenance, 
which signified the extent of leakages in the construction of the FCs both 
in the hardware and the software aspects. As political representation of 
these gram panchayat reveals, the non-left coalition seems to be stronger. 
The objective function of such an arrangement is to keep the communist 
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party out of the fray at least till the subsequent panchayat election. On the 
other hand, the works appeared to be relatively better in the case of Bahadur 
which had a very strong leftist presence. Though there were cases where 
the basic idea of farmers’ participation was hijacked, the implementation 
of the programme was much better and at least there were few cases where 
the entire scheme went haywire with the farmers openly cursing the 
panchayat entrusted contractors. Informal discussions with the panchayat 
and party officials also revealed that in the case of implementation of many 
of the schemes the party seems to have strict control over the disbursement, 
to the extent that even an elected representative cannot on his/her own 
arrange to wield a patronage baton by virtue of his position. Even the mode 
of disbursement needs to be decided by the party and finally delivered by 
the party. The strict control over panchayat by the party was also reflected by 
Lieten (1988) when he found that sitting communist party representatives 
were debarred for subsequent election as they were charged with official 
corruption. 
3. The third source is the simultaneous and shared domain of canal irrigation 
by the PRI and the irrigation department in which ultimately the PRI has 
the power on the ground to get things done through the department, since 
the latter has no money and fewer functionaries. 
The study of the implementation of the CADA programme across different 
political panchayat seems to indicate that the presence of strong party behind 
the panchayat actually checks the panchayat from becoming a blatantly cor-
rupt institution on one hand but on the other hand also propagates a silent 
corruption. Veron et al. (2006) also reported similar findings while studying 
the employment assurance scheme in rural West Bengal where they found that 
upward accountability or political accountability towards the panchayat and the 
party seems to dominate over horizontal accountability between the BC and the 
department functionaries of the beneficiary committee. Thus, while corruption 
was palpable in Old Malda which was politically well contested, it was silent in 
Debra, a CPI(M) stronghold. Even in our fieldwork we did find that where the 
gram panchayats were non-leftist coalitions the extent of corruption is easily 
palpable. The reason is simply that while the panchayat members’ accountability 
may be limited to just winning a panchayat election or a term of five years, the 
party needs to maintain a permanent pro-poor and responsive image in the minds 
of the rural populace, or at least a critical mass, which is a political compulsion 
for the party.
Thus at the micro level the panchayat intervention though unsystematic was 
palpable in terms of knee-jerk responses. Though there were instances where 
the gram panchayat would leverage its finance to build up unlined channels 
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through the Swarnajayanti Gramin Rozgar Yojana (SGRY) funds, any organized 
effort even from the side of the panchayat to revitalize the moribund beneficiary 
committees seems missing. A system of low level equilibrium existed whereby 
the beneficiary committee lay defunct in many cases, the field channels catered to 
half its command, the farmers would travel an extra mile to draw water through 
unlined channels and the panchayat intervened only when the situation was 
conflicting; and all this when a substantial population, particularly the marginal 
and the landless, showed marked improvement with the advent of the canal. Thus 
the system seemed to be trapped in a low level equilibrium situation whereby 
none of the actors (the community or the political) actually intervened.
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Notes
1. The canal system can be broadly phased into Headwork, Secondary and Tertiary level. 
The headwork is the conveyance structure which includes the main canal coming out 
of storage or a diversion. The secondary level would be the distribution structure which 
may be the distributaries, sub distributaries, minors and sub minors coming out from 
the distributaries. The tertiary level refers to the actual command area which may be 
minor if the minor directly irrigates a patch or may be sub minors and water courses.
2. The Beneficiary Committee is the West Bengal version of Water User Associations 
(WUA). Most of the decentralization programmes in West Bengal take place through 
formation of beneficiary committees.
3. Apart from the recent string of studies like the one that was done by Bardhan and 
Mookherjee and the study under DFID’s strengthening rural decentralization project 
where large scale surveys were done throughout West Bengal, seminal works of Lieton, 
Webstar, Ghatak and Ghatak, and Harris were case studies done over districts of 
Bankura, Birbhum, Midnapore, Burdwan all of which are districts in South Bengal.
4. There are 12, 33, 38 and 15 field channels in Mantadari, Shikarpur, Belakoba and 
Bahadur GP, respectively.
5. Designed command was obtained from the CADA and the actual irrigated area 
was the estimate obtained from the farmers over the command/BC members/Petty 
contractors.
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6. R = .848. R Square = .719, Residual SS = 839.6, Regression SS = 2151.97, T value for 
Designed command is –2.04 and T value for members in BC is 2.02.
7. Marginal farmers own < 1 hectare, small 1–2 hectares, semi medium 2–4 hectares, 
medium 4–10 hectares and large > 10 hectares.
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